Business regulations and economic growth: What can be explained?  by Messaoud, Boudhiaf & Teheni, Zribi El Ghak
INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT REVIEW 2 (2014) 69–78
journal homepage: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ism
HOSTED BY Available online at www.sciencedirect.com
ScienceDirect
2306-7748 © 2014 Holy Spirit University of Kaslik. Hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ism.2014.03.001 
Business regulations and economic growth: What can be explained? 
 
Boudhiaf Messaouda, Zribi El Ghak Tehenib,* 
aLIEI, Faculty of Economic Sciences and Management of Tunis, University of Tunis El Manar, Post box 248 - 2092 Tunis El Manar II, Tunisia 
bFaculté des sciences économiques et de gestion de Tunis, Laboratoire d'intégration économique internationale, Université Tunis El Manar, Boite postale 
248, Tunis 2092, Tunisie 
 
A R T I C L E  I N F O 
Article history: 
Submited date 21-Dec-13 
Revised date     
Accepted date  15-Jul-14 
 
Keywords: 
Doing Business 
 Economic Growth 
 Economic Policies 
Instrumental Approach 
 Regulations 
 
A B S T R A C T 
This paper investigates business regulations-economic growth nexus in 162 countries over the period 
2007-2011. It uses ten indicators of Doing Business and a set of control variables. The results provide a 
robust link between regulation indices and economic growth except Trading Across Borders and Dealing 
with Construction Permits indices. Regulation indices and control variables don’t matter in term of growth 
induction in Africa. This finding suggests some policy conclusions that can help poor nations to grow 
faster. 
© 2014xxxxxxxx. Hosting by ElsevierB.V. All rights reserved.  
 
 
 
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +216-23-729-094; fax: +216-71-870-277.  
E-mail address: elghateheni@yahoo.fr 
© 2014 Holy Spirit University of Kaslik. Hosting by Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Peer review under responsibility of Holy Spirit University of Kaslik.
INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT REVIEW 2 (2014) 69–7870
1. Introduction 
In the current economic climate, growth remains a key government 
priority. The literature on economic growth has turned to the effects of 
country’s political, legal, economic and social institutions on wealth 
and long-term growth (Acemoglu et al. [1, 2], Dollar and Kraay[13], 
Easterly and Levine [15], Hall and Jones [17], Knack and Keefer [21], 
Mauro [26], Rodrik et al. [27], and many others).It is obvious that 
countries with better institutions grow faster. However, as noted by 
Rodrik et al. [20], it is difficult to identify which institutions matter and 
how does one acquire them. This is a question of some practical 
importance. In recent years, the proliferation of datasets aiming to 
measure a wide gamut of institutional reforms allowed economists to 
make progress in this area. In this context, the World Bank has been 
publishing a series of annual Doing Business reports since 
2004investigating regulationsthat enhance business activity and 
thosethat constrain it. As a result, articles focusing on the effect of 
business regulations on economic growth appeared(Djankov et al. [12], 
Haider[19], Hanusch[20] and Loayza et al. [24-25]). 
The objective of this paper is to contribute to the existing 
literature.In line with earlier studies, our paper takes a close look at 
how robust is the relationship between business regulations and 
economic growth, but with some differences. First, the data are drawn 
for a more recent time period.Second, Haider[19] and Hanusch[20] 
included a set of regional dummy variables, whereas this paper 
includes only the African dummy because the results from the 
empirical growth literature systematically show Africa with the largest 
unexplained growth underperformance. Therefore, it is interesting to 
focus on this region.Second, the choice of control variables is generally 
based on Djankov et al. [12], Hanusch[20] and Loayza et al. [24-25], 
but with view. Whileauthorsfocused on governanceamong the 
determining factor of growth, especially Loayza et al. [24-25], this 
paper differs in concentrating on financial development rather than 
wider governance issues, which enrich the analysis. Djankov et al. [12] 
and Hanusch[20] used an instrumental variable approach and OLS 
regressions to test the robustness of their results.  The results generally 
uphold. However, from an econometric point of view, the OLS 
estimator is biased and inconsistent due to endogeneity of business 
regulations indicators, so we only use two-stage least 
regressions.Hanusch[20] explored his result by dividing the sample in 
two groups: poor countries and rich countries. Unfortunately, in our 
context, this will lead to a steep decline in the number of observations. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II 
reviewsliterature. Section III describes the dataset and the empirical 
strategy. Section IV assesses the effect of business regulations on 
economic growth. Section V concludes the paper and draws 
implications for sustainable economic policies. 
2. Literature review 
Numerous potential growth determinants have been identified over the 
years.Over the last decade, a body of literature has exploredthe 
relationship between business regulations and economic performance. 
A number of studies does not deal with the effect of business 
regulation on economic growth directly but instead focuses on the 
effect of business regulation on one of the growth drivers 
(labourproductivity, investment, innovation, total factor productivity). 
Busse and Groizard[6]for example use a standard cross-country growth 
regression with regulation interacted with FDI inflows and other 
control variables. Regulation is measured by five components of the 
World Bank Doing Business Indicators. They find that FDI does not 
stimulate growth in economies with excessive business and labour 
regulations. 
In a sample of more than 26,000 manufacturing establishments 
across 71 countries (both OECD and developing), Dutz et al. [14] find 
that the aggregate Doing Business indicator,as well as its sub-indexes, 
are positivelycorrelated with product and process innovationfor young 
firms in non-OECDcountries. These findingsstress the importance of 
businessenvironment in stimulating incentivesfor competition and 
innovation. 
Using a panel of micro-data on firms from the European Union 
between 2002 and 2008, Dall’Olioet al.[8] investigate whether 
structural or firm-specific characteristicscontributed more to labor 
productivity growth. Resultsshow that improvements in the Doing 
Business indicators are positively correlated with increased labor 
productivity in manufacturingand services in EU-15 and EU-
12countries, though the magnitude of thisassociation is larger in EU-12 
countries. 
Other studiessupplymore insight on direct links between business 
regulation and growth.Djankov et al. [12] for example investigate the 
impact of business regulations on growth in 135 countries during 1993- 
2002. They find that business regulations index and growth are 
consistently and positively correlated. Countries with less burdensome 
business regulations grow faster. The authors examine the magnitude 
by including dummies for each quartile of the business regulation index 
in the OLS regressions. The result shows that improving from the worst 
(first) to the best (fourth) quartile of business regulations implies a 2.3 
percentage point increase in average annual growth. The main result 
remains robust after the inclusion of commonly used measures of 
institutional quality from International Country Risk Guide and 
Transparency International. 
Also, Hanusch[20] discuss the potential role of the Doing Business 
indicators in the reform process.The choice of control variables is 
generally based on Djankov et al. [12], yet the data are drawn for a 
more recent time period, from 2003 to 2009, and a number of 
additional variables are used. Author reports results for five-year and 
10-year average growth respectively. Data availability restricts the 
sample size to 175 countries. The evidence shows that focusing on 
indicators relating to credit and the enforcement of contracts is the most 
important. Indicators related to cost have the largest potential for 
fostering growth. Unlike Djankov et al. [12], the analysis isalso made 
for poor countries and rich countries separately (the sample was 
divided on median log GDP per capita). The doing business indicator 
coefficient is significant for only the developing country sample, both 
for 5-year and 10-year growth. The effect remains when removing the 
regional dummies. 
In the same order of ideas, Loayza et al. [24]focus on two key 
measures of macroeconomic performance, namely the growth and 
volatility of real GDP. The sample covers 76 countries. The 
authorsinteract the regulation index with a governance proxy. In 
general, regulation tends to reduce growth. In most instances, better 
institutions help mitigate, and even eliminate, the adverse impact of 
regulation on macroeconomic performance. 
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Using a large sample of industrial and developing countries, Loayza 
et al. [25] suggest that a heavier regulatory burden reduces growthand 
increase the size of the informal sector. The negative effectsof 
excessive regulation are aggravated in countries with poor governance. 
On a related issue,Dawson [10] estimates both “direct” and 
“indirect” effects of business regulation on growth. The estimates of 
the indirect effect show that the index of business regulation is 
statistically significant and positively related to growth. This result 
suggests that countries with less business regulation experience higher 
long-run growth rates as a result of higher total factor productivity. For 
example, a one standard deviation above the mean increase in the 
business regulation index is a 9 percentage point increase in 20-year 
growth rates for a sample of 64 countries. The estimates of the indirect 
effect reveal that business regulations are statistically significant and 
negatively related to growth. The estimated impact on growth from 
business regulation is 16 percentage points over the 20-year sample 
period. 
Unlike Djankov et al. [12], Hanusch[20] and Loayza et al. [24-25], 
Castroet al. [7] consider a specific aspect of business regulation: 
investor protection,which is introduced in the familiar two-period 
OLGmodel of capital accumulation.The theoretical result is that the 
positive effect of investor protection on growth isstronger for countries 
with lower restrictions on capital flows.Castroet al.[7]conduct a 
statistical analysis of cross-sectional data on growth, investor 
protection, and openness, and then explore the development 
experiencesof South Korea and India. They find that the data 
providessome support for their prediction. 
Also, Haidar[18]looks at how the state of investors protections 
affects income level and growth in 170 countries over the period1980–
2004. The data is based on theinvestor protections index of 
doingbusiness. Itmeasures the strength of minority shareholder 
protections againstdirectors' misuse of corporate assets for personal 
gain.Results show that the level of investorprotection matters for cross-
country differences in GDP growth: countries with stronger protections 
tend togrow faster than those with poor investor protections. 
In a recent study, Haider[19]investigates the connection between 
investor protection - among 9 other business regulatory reforms -and 
economicgrowth rates in 172 countries over the period 2006–2010. A 
five-year dataset on business regulatory reforms from the World 
Bank’s Doing Business reports as well as variables that capture 
macroeconomic dynamics are used. In contrast to previous studies, the 
main independent variable, Reform, is defined as the total number of 
reformshappening in a country during a certain period of time (2006–
2010 and 2006–2008). Each individual reform is coded as a dummy 
variable equal to 1 if a positive reform occurredin one or more of the 10 
indicators in a given year and 0 otherwise.The key empirical finding is 
that business regulatory reforms are good for economic growth: on 
average, each business regulatory reform is associated with a 0.15% 
increase in growth rate of GDP. The author indicates that reforms, 
which improved business and investment climate, may have helped to 
mitigate the effects of the 2008 global slump in economic growth. 
Countries with more business regulatory reforms enjoyed higher 
economic growth rates1. 
1pp. 295. 
 
3. Data description and Methods 
As is standard in the literature, economic growth is measured as the 
average annual rate of per capita real GDP growth2. We use growth in 
real PPP-adjusted per-capita income from 2007 to 2011 because it more 
captures the standard of living across different countries and is not 
subject to large re-orderings in rank as a result of exchange rate 
fluctuations. 
We use the World Bank Doing Business indicators [31]as measures 
of business regulations. The relative importance of Business regulatory 
indicators may not be contested. For example, they help governments 
gauge the ‘health’ of their regulatory regime through country 
benchmarking. They try to inform the design of reforms that will give 
the largest gains on the overall ranking because indicators are backed 
by an extensive description of regulations3. 
Table 1-The Doing Business Indicators. 
1- Ease of doing business:  overall indicator(DB1) 
2- Starting a 
Business 
(DB2) 
Procedures (number) 
7-Paying 
Taxes 
(DB7) 
Payments (number per year) 
Time (days) Time (hours per year) 
Cost (% of income per 
capita) Profit tax (%) 
Paid-in Min. Capital (% 
of income per capita) Labor tax and contributions (%) 
3- Dealing 
with 
Construction 
Permits(DB3) 
Procedures (number) Other taxes (%) 
Time (days) Total tax rate (% profit) 
Cost (% of income per 
capita) 
8- 
TradingAcro
ssBorders 
(DB8) 
Documents to export (number) 
Time to export (days) 
Cost to export (US$ per container) 
Documents to import (number) 
4- 
RegisteringP
roperty 
(DB4) 
Procedures (number) 
9- 
EnforcingCo
ntracts (DB9) 
Time to import (days) 
Time (days) Cost to import (US$ per container) 
Cost (% of property 
value) Time (days) 
5- 
GettingCredi
t(DB5) 
Strength of legal rights 
index (0-10) 
10- 
ResolvingIns
olvency 
(DB10) 
Cost (% of claim) 
Depth of credit 
information index (0-6) Procedures (number) 
Public registry coverage 
(% of adults) Time (years) 
Private bureau coverage 
(% of adults) Cost (% of estate) 
6- 
ProtectingInv
estors (DB6) 
Extent of disclosure index 
(0-10) 
Outcome (0 as piecemeal sale and 1 
as going concern) 
Extent of director liability 
index (0-10) Recovery rate (cents on the dollar) 
Ease of shareholder suits 
index (0-10) 
Strength of investor 
protection index (0-10) 
Source: World Bank Database [31]. 
 
The “Doing Business” dataset provides 9 sets of indicators and their 
constituent components covering all stages of a business’s life cycle: 
from its incorporation through its operation, to its closure (Table 
1).These are combined into an overall "ease of doing business" 
ranking.Economies are ranked on their ease of doing business, from 1–
183. A high ranking on the ease of doing business index means the 
2Unlike Loayza et al. [24], we do not consider the volatility of real GDP. 
3See the World Bank Doing Business (2004) report [30]for details. 
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regulatory environment is more conducive to the starting and operation 
of a local firm. We take the simple average of country rankings in each 
of the ten topics in the database. We then normalize this index to vary 
between zero and one according to the 
formula: , for ranking R and country i. Higher 
value indicate heavier regulation regulatory burden4.  
To check the robustness of our results, we consider several 
additional potential determinants of growthpresented in Table 2. The 
choice of control variables is generally based on Djankov et al. [12], 
Hanusch[20] and Loayza et al. [24-25], but with view5.  
We consider the initial level of real per capita GDP to account for a 
conditional convergence process. We expect a significant and sizeable 
negative coefficient. 
Government expenditure to GDP ratio is used to measure the 
degree of government intervention in other words the size of the public 
sector. The smaller the ratio, the higher is the reliance on markets. We 
include a measure of humancapital in our specification: Primary school 
enrollment is the log of the percent of the cohort that is enrolled in 
primary school in initial period.  
Debt servicing may aggravate the debt problem of the heavily 
indebted countries. There is a relationship between external debt 
servicing and economic growth. The rise in the debt servicing ratio 
affects economic growth negatively. The decline in the rate of growth 
reduces the capacity of an economy to service its debt. 
As a proxy of macroeconomic instability, we use the absolute 
deviation from average deflator in initial period 2007. 
To account for financial sector development, we consider two 
measures. First, the ratio of private domestic credit to GDP. It refers to 
financial resources provided to the private sector, such as through 
loans, purchases of nonequity securities, and trade credits and other 
accounts receivable, that establish a claim for repayment. For some 
countries these claims include credit to public enterprises. Second, 
Money and quasi money (M2)/GDP as a general indicator of the size of 
financial intermediaries relative to the size of the economy. It is 
average of data for available years from 2007 to 2011.  
The inclusion of regional specific effects has the advantage of 
controlling for unobserved regional heterogeneity. African countries 
generally form a significant part of the cross-country samples, and the 
region has a special place in the literature on growth. African countries 
are characterized by civil conflict, mismanagement and disease and 
hence Africa dummy variable is included in the equation. We try to 
capture the characteristics of Africa countries influences on growth 
indirectly rather than directly.  
Fallowing Djankov et al. [12] andLoayza et al. [24], the 
instrumental variables, introduced to isolate the exogenous variation in 
the regulation indices, are the initial level of per capita GDP, binary 
variables that denote legal origin (British, French, German, and 
4We refer the interested reader to Djankov et al. [12] and Hanusch[20] for 
details on the construction of the business regulation indices. 
5 In this study, we do not include the quality of governance.Unlike 
Hanusch[20], even if the period is characterized by crisis, we do not include 
exports and FDI inflows to capture countries’ exposure to crisis. 
 
 
Nordic), proxies for the degree of Western influence based on the 
fraction of the population that speaks a major European language and 
Absolute latitude of the country. 
In the analysis, the economic and finance data were collected from 
several sources according to availability.  Table 2 provides a definition 
of all variables and respective sources. 
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Table2 -Description of variables. 
Variables Description Sources Expected signs 
Growth Growth rate of real per capita GDP (PPP, constant 2005 international $).  
GC 
Government consumption as % of GDP (scale from 0 to 100). General 
government final consumption expenditure includes all government current 
expenditures for purchases of goods and services (including compensation of 
employees). It also includes most expenditures on national defense and 
security, but excludes government military expenditures that are part of 
government capital formation. Average of the years 2007-2011. 
World Bank. World Development 
Indicators. 2012. 
 
+/- 
AD Absolute deviation from average deflator in initial period 2007. - 
Ln(GDPpc2007) Log of GDP per capita in initial period 2007. - 
LLGDP Money and quasi money (M2) as % of GDP + 
DCP Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP). + 
HKP Primary school enrollment in initial period 2007. +/- 
TDS Total debt service as % of GNI. Average of the years 2007-2011. - 
Africa Dummy variable 1=Africa and 0=otherwise. +/- 
DB Doing Business indicators 
World Bank. Doing Business 2012. 
Washington, D.C, 2012 available at 
www.doingbusiness.org 
+ 
LA Absolute latitude of the country scaled to take the values between 0 and 1. 
CIA World Factbook: Average 
latitude and longitude for countries 
around the world, Updated 
November 30th, 2007, available 
atwww.maxmind.com/en/country_l
atlon 
 
RE Principal religion in the country (Catholic, Muslim, Protestant, Other). 
CIA World Factbook: Religion 
statistics for the world, available 
atwww.religionfacts.com/religion_s
tatistics/religion_statistics_by_count
ry.htm 
 
SD Legal origin (English, French, German, Nordic and Socialist. 
CIA World Factbook (28 July 
2005), available 
atwww.nationmaster.com/graph/gov
_leg_ori-government-legal-origin 
Ang Percentage of English speaking population. 
Commonwealth Nations Research 
Society (CNRS), available at 
http://cnrsociety.org/5v-f-
union.html and CIA World 
Factbook, available at 
www.cia.gov/library/publications/th
e-world-factbook/ 
Source: Authors.
 
The sample consists of 162 countries and for which information on 
the main variables is available (Table 3). We have 35 high-income 
countries and 127 otherwise that are classified as eligible for the World 
Bank, of which 47 belong to Africa, 39 to Europe, 36 to Asia, 20 to 
north America, 10 to south America and 10 to Oceania. Unlike 
Djankov et al.[12], Hanusch[20] and Loayza et al. [24-25], the data are 
drawn for a recent time period, from 2007 to 2011. 
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Table 3 -Countries in the sample. 
Albania Ecuador Lao PDR Sao Tome and Principe 
Algeria Egypt, Arab Rep. Latvia Saudi Arabia 
Angola El Salvador Lebanon Senegal 
Antigua and Barbuda Equatorial Guinea Lesotho Serbia 
Argentina Eritrea Lithuania Seychelles 
Armenia Estonia Macedonia, FYR Sierra Leone 
Australia Ethiopia Madagascar Singapore 
Austria Fiji Malawi Slovak Republic 
Azerbaijan Finland Malaysia Slovenia 
Bangladesh France Maldives Solomon Islands 
Belgium Gabon Mali South Africa 
Belize Gambia, The Mauritania Spain 
Benin Georgia Mauritius Sri Lanka 
Bhutan Germany Mexico St. Kitts and Nevis 
Bolivia Ghana Micronesia, Fed. Sts. St. Lucia 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Greece Moldova St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
Botswana Grenada Mongolia Sudan 
Brazil Guatemala Montenegro Swaziland 
Bulgaria Guinea Morocco Sweden 
Burkina Faso Guinea-Bissau Mozambique Switzerland 
Burundi Haiti Namibia Tajikistan 
Cambodia Honduras Nepal Tanzania 
Cameroon Hong Kong SAR, China Netherlands Thailand 
Canada Hungary Nicaragua Timor-Leste 
Cape Verde Iceland Niger Togo 
Central African Republic India Nigeria Tonga 
Chad Indonesia Norway Trinidad and Tobago 
Chile Iraq Oman Tunisia 
China Ireland Pakistan Turkey 
Colombia Israel Palau Uganda 
Comoros Italy Panama Ukraine 
Congo, Dem. Rep. Jamaica Papua New Guinea United Arab Emirates 
Congo, Rep. Japan Paraguay United Kingdom 
Costa Rica Jordan Peru United States 
Cote d'Ivoire Kazakhstan Philippines Uruguay 
Croatia Kenya Poland Uzbekistan 
Czech Republic Kiribati Portugal Vanuatu 
Denmark Korea, Rep. Romania Venezuela, RB 
Dominica Kuwait Russian Federation Vietnam 
Dominican Republic Kyrgyz Republic Rwanda Yemen, Rep. 
 Samoa Zambia 
Source: Authors.
  
The empirical specification follows Djankov et al.[12], 
Hanusch[20] and Loayza et al. [24].We test the relationship between 
business regulations and growth using the “standard” cross-country 
growth regression below:   
 
)1(')( 2007 HODE  ¦ XDBGDPLncGrowth pc  
 
where, Growth is the annual average GDP per capita growth rate 
between 2007 and 2011, c is the intercept, Ln(GDPpc2007) is the 
logarithm of GDP per capita in initial period, E, D and O are variable 
coefficients, DB represents business regulations indicators, X is a set of 
control variable, and H is the error term. 
The OLS estimator is biased and inconsistent for D due to 
endogeneity of business regulations indicators, meaning that changes in 
business regulations indicators are associated not only with changes in 
Growth but also changes in the error H. What is needed is a method to 
generate only exogenous variation in of business regulations indicators. 
Unlike Djankov et al. [12] and Loayza et al. [24], we only use two-
stage least regressions. To isolate the exogenous variation in the 
business regulations indicators, legal origin of a country’s commercial 
code or company low, absolute latitude, initial level of GDP per capita, 
religion and language are used as instrumental variables. 
We check whether the model is correctly specified and whether the 
instruments are valid. We perform Basmann's[5] and Sargan's[28]tests 
of overidentifying restrictions for our regression estimated via 
instrumental variables in which the number of instruments exceeds the 
number of regressors: that is, for an overidentified equation.  These are 
tests of the joint null hypothesis that the excluded instruments are valid 
instruments, i.e., uncorrelated with the error term and correctly 
excluded from the estimated equation. A rejection casts doubt on the 
validity of the instruments. Both statistics are distributed as chi-square. 
A statistically significant test statistic indicates that the instruments 
may not be valid. 
We conduct several regression estimates of equation (1). We use as 
explanatory variables a measure of business regulations and a set of 
basic control variables. 
4. Regression results 
Results from estimating equation (1) are reported in Table 4. Columns 
1–40 report the results including each of the Business environment 
indices separately.  
Basmann's[5] and Sargan's[28] statisticsindicate that the null 
hypothesis that the error term is uncorrelated with the instruments is 
not rejected since the P-values are greater than the 5% level of 
significance. The validity of the instrumental variables of the regression 
is therefore confirmed and the model is correctly specified. 
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Table 4 -Effects of business regulations on economic growth. 
 
 DB1 DB2 DB3 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
DB 5.577** (2.19) 
4.659* 
(1.93) 
4.132**   
(1.97) 
3.748* 
(1.82) 
3.662* 
(1.91) 
3.697* 
(1.87) 
3.205* 
(1.80) 
3.027* 
(1.74) 
-1.078 
(-0.40) 
-0.342 
(-0.13) 
1.640   
(0.44)    
1.835 
(0.50) 
Ln(GDPpc2007) 
-0.735* 
(-1.66) 
-1.139** 
(-2.59) 
-1.164***   
  (-3.47)    
-1.460***   
(-4.29)    
-0.353 
(-1.00) 
-0.867** 
(-2.28) 
-0.907***   
(-3.48) 
-1.226*** 
(-4.38) 
-0.015 
(-0.05) 
-0.605* 
(-1.68) 
-0.751**   
( -2.48)    
-1.159*** 
(-3.31) 
GC -0.036* (-1.91) 
-0.041** 
(-2.30) -- -- 
-0.032* 
(-1.72) 
-0.039** 
(-2.21) -- -- 
-0.020 
(-1.14) 
-0.029* 
(-1.71) -- -- 
TDS -0.156** (-2.83) 
-0.169*** 
(-3.26) -- -- 
-0.136** 
(-2.56) 
-0.154** 
(-3.01) -- -- 
-0.111** 
(-2.17) 
-0.135** 
(-2.74) -- -- 
LLGDP -- -- 0.023***     (3.19)   
0.021**    
(3.02) -- -- 
0 .025***   
(3.23) 
0.023** 
(3.06) -- -- 
0.021**   
(2.66)    
0.019** 
(2.53) 
DCP -- -- -.0325***  (-3.62)       
-0.029***   
(-3.36)    -- -- 
-0.031***   
(-3.49) 
-0.029** 
(-3.27) -- -- 
-0.027**   
(-2.28)    
-0.025** 
(-2.19) 
Africa -- -1.775** (-2.81) -- 
-1.420**   
(-2.42)    -- 
-1.730** 
(-2.69) -- 
-1.378** 
(-2.29) -- 
-1.931** 
(-3.11) -- 
-1.646** 
(-2.62) 
C 16.465** (2.71) 
20.460*** 
(3.48) 
14.133***   
(3.74)   
16.886***   
(4.48)    
11.573** 
(2.44) 
17.314*** 
(3.49) 
11.342***  
(4.10) 
14.401*** 
(5.04) 
4.702 
(0.98) 
11.783** 
(2.38) 
9.296**   
(2.08)    
13.414** 
(2.75) 
Sargan Test 
Ȥ1 1.83742 1.41139 2.80689 2.59502 5.40243 0.130891 3.85634 2.60285 9.32154 7.13331 3.90649 3.58446 
Basmann Test 
Ȥ1 1.71909 1.296 2.6758 2.44582 5.00764 0.120041 3.64123 2.40664 9.10627 6.66961 3.76124 3.40866 
Obs. 82 82 114 114 82 83 114 114 82 82 114 114 
 DB4 DB5 DB6 
 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
DB 
 
4.682* 
(1.89) 
2.729 
(1.11) 
5.869** 
(2.04) 
5.717* 
(1.69) 
5.876** 
(2.58) 
5.337* 
(1.79) 
4.000** 
(2.06) 
3.381** 
(1.97) 
4.016* 
(1.97) 
3.821** 
(2.03) 
3.609** 
(2.17) 
3.427** 
(2.11) 
Ln(GDPpc2007) 
-0.575 
(-1.36) 
-0.808** 
(-2.08) 
-1.186*** 
(-3.40) 
-1.306*** 
(-4.07) 
-0.939** 
(-2.02) 
-1.251** 
(-2.47) 
-1.060*** 
(-3.75) 
-1.273*** 
(-4.71) 
-0.138 
(-0.45) 
-0.598* 
(-1.73) 
-0.820*** 
(-3.66) 
-1.140*** 
(-4.54) 
GC -0.027 (-1.50) 
-0.031* 
(-1.58) -- -- 
-0.036* 
(-1.95) 
-0.041** 
(-2.23) -- -- 
-0.010 
(-0.54) 
-0.017 
(-0.95) -- -- 
TDS -0.121** (-2.30) 
-0.136** 
(-2.76) -- -- 
-0.128** 
(-2.46) 
-0.139** 
(-2.73) -- -- 
-0.127** 
(-2.52) 
-0.145** 
(-2.96) -- -- 
LLGDP -- -- 0.027*** (3.20) 
0.026** 
(2.93) 
-- -- 0.023*** 
(3.33) 
 0.021** 
(3.13) 
-- -- 0.025*** 
(3.44) 
0.023*** 
(3.27) 
DCP -- -- -0.033*** (-3.45) 
-.0032** 
(-3.06) 
-- -- -0.030*** 
(-3.76) 
-0.027** 
(-3.48) 
-- -- -0.030*** 
(-3.74) 
-0.028*** 
(-3.51) 
Africa -- -1.546** (-2.16) -- 
-0.551 
(-0.62) -- 
-1.276* 
(-1.76) -- 
-1.135* 
(-1.89) -- 
-1.598** 
(-2.48) -- 
-1.360** 
(-2.38) 
C 13.198** (2.45) 
15.166** 
(3.13) 
14.900*** 
(3.65) 
16.018*** 
(4.34) 
17.492** 
(3.01) 
20.810*** 
(3.25) 
12.718*** 
(4.23) 
14.606*** 
(5.44) 
7.240** 
(1.97) 
12.332** 
(3.08) 
10.500*** 
(4.85) 
13.578*** 
(5.73) 
Sargan Test 
Ȥ1 
5.14326 
 6.89438 1.59479 2.02948 2.29568 0.280498 3.20518 3.90822 3.0469 2.96631 3.13653 1.6821 
Basmann Test 
Ȥ1 5.75133 6.33391 1.48973 1.88501 2.04497 0.257713 3.03754 3.62096 2.81716 2.62725 2.94235 1.55753 
Obs. 82 82 114 114 82 83 114 114 82 82 114 114 
 DB7 DB8 DB9 
 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 
DB 5.920* (1.96) 
4.190** 
(2.07) 
2.386 
(0.93) 
4.506* 
(1.69) 
-3.856 
(-1.37) 
-9.553 
(-1.46) 
2.420 
(0.56) 
-2.034 
(-0.62) 
4.795** 
(2.34) 
4.256** 
(2.08) 
2.106 
(1.28) 
4.091 
(1.55) 
Ln(GDPpc2007) 
-0.029 
(-0.09) 
-0.690** 
(-2.02) 
-0.775** 
(-3.04) 
-1.342*** 
(-4.08) 
0.420 
(0.85) 
0.449 
(0.50) 
-0.892* 
(-1.94) 
-0.891** 
(-2.44) 
-0.518 
(-1.38) 
-1.010** 
(-2.58) 
-0.835*** 
(-3.27) 
-1.352*** 
(-4.08) 
GC -0.030 (-1.59) 
-0.037** 
(-2.20) -- -- 
-0.005 
(-0.26) 
-0.008 
(-0.24) -- -- 
-0.030* 
(-1.66) 
-0.037** 
(-2.14) -- -- 
TDS -0.184** (-2.84) 
-0.189*** 
(-3.49) -- -- 
-0.111* 
(-1.97) 
-0.132* 
(-1.83) -- -- 
-0.143** 
(-2.67) 
-0.161** 
(-3.17) -- -- 
LLGDP -- -- 0 .021** (2.85) 
0.020** 
(2.65) -- -- 
0.018** 
(2.40) 
0.019** 
(2.64) -- -- 
0.022** 
(3.03) 
0.022** 
(2.94) 
DCP -- -- -0.028** (-2.99) 
-0.030** 
(-3.09) -- -- 
-0.027** 
(-2.70) 
-0.018** 
(-1.99) -- -- 
-0.027*** 
(-3.32) 
-0.029** 
(-3.11) 
Africa -- -2.251** (-3.56) -- 
-1.952** 
(-2.91) -- 
-2.342** 
(-2.42) -- 
-1.714** 
(-2.71) -- 
-1.874** 
(-2.97) -- 
-1.464** 
(-2.47) 
C 10.621** (2.32) 
16.517*** 
(3.70) 
9.953** 
(3.14) 
16.753*** 
(4.17) 
-2.83 
(-0.29) 
-6.402 
(-0.46) 
10.990* 
(1.70) 
8.660* 
(1.82) 
13.258*** 
(2.72) 
18.482*** 
(3.56) 
10.078*** 
(3.81) 
15.974*** 
(4.15) 
Sargan Test 
Ȥ1 4.86197 4.26885 4.69937 3.73191 4.16612 0.139848 2.00175 7.05268 4.01346 0.777087 5.80235 1.1595 
Basmann Test 
Ȥ1 4.47509 3.78936 4.51446 3.41824 3.85386 0.128128 1.87667 6.59454 3.6539 0.689416 5.46998 1.10001 
Obs. 82 82 114 114 82 82 114 114 82 82 114 115 
In the interest of space, the body of the table do not include columns of p-values for a given chi square value, which we keep available on request. 
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Table 4 -Continued. 
 DB10 
 37 38 39 40 
DB 6.766* (1.79) 
5.989* 
(1.72) 
6.947* 
(1.92) 
5.640* 
(1.73) 
Ln(GDPpc2007) 
-0.620 
(-1.28) 
-1.328*** 
(-2.33) 
-1.183** 
(-3.15) 
-1.669*** 
(-3.66) 
GC -0.029 (-1.38) 
-0.040** 
(-2.03) -- -- 
TDS -0.129** (-2.11) 
-0.155** 
(-2.75) -- -- 
LLGDP -- -- 0.019** (2.29) 
0.017** 
(2.23) 
DCP -- -- -0.035*** (-3.19) 
-0.030** 
(-3.09) 
Africa -- -2.600** (-3.16) -- 
-2.417** 
(-3.02) 
C 15.189** (2.25) 
22.721** 
(2.98) 
15.972*** 
(3.28) 
20.116*** 
(3.56) 
6DUJDQ7HVWȤ1 0.151427 0.047925 0.461085 0.576661 
%DVPDQQ7HVWȤ1 0.136906 0.043909 0.426408 0.533835 
Obs. 82 83 114 114 
-statistics in parentheses. 
*,**,*** denote significance at 10 percent, 5 percent; and 1 percent, respectively. 
1 / H0: Model is correctly specified and the instruments are valid. 
 
Most regulation indices have the expected signs and are correlated to 
the average growth rate except Dealing with Construction Permits and 
Trading Across Bordersindicesthat have a negative and not statically 
significant impact on growth (columns 9-12 and 29-32, Table 4). This 
finding isambiguous.We may explain the negative effect of Trading 
Across Borders indices on growth by sample selection bias.  Most 
countries in our sample are at the bottom.To shed light on these 
indicators, Tables 5 and 6 show where dealing with construction permits 
and trading across borders are easy and where not for the years 2007 and 
2010, for the top 10 countries.Ranking shows that obtaining a 
construction permit in Africa takes longer than the actual construction (In 
2007 (2011), 5 (4) of the 10 countries where it is most difficult to build 
legally, table 5). In 2009/2010, Sub-Saharan Africa accounted for the 
most reforms of the construction permitting process, followed by Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia.  
 
Table 5 -Where is dealing with construction permits easy and where 
not? 
2007 
Easiest Most difficult 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines   
Japan  
Thailand  
Belize  
Marshall Islands  
 Denmark  
St. Kitts and Nevis   
Singapore  
Maldives   
St. Lucia  
Guatemala 
Guinea 
Iran 
Burkina Faso 
Egypt  
Croatia 
Zimbabwe  
Tanzania 
Eritrea  
Timor-Leste 
2011 
Easiest Most difficult 
Hong Kong SAR, China 
Singapore 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 
Belize 
New Zealand 
Marshall Islands 
Georgia 
St. Kitts and Nevis 
Maldives 
Denmark 
Malawi 
Burundi 
Serbia 
India 
Tajikistan 
Ukraine 
Tanzania 
China 
Russian Federation 
Eritrea 
Source: Doing Business. 
Trading Across Borders indices cover procedural requirements such as 
documentation requirements and procedures at customs and other 
regulatory agencies as well as at the port. It also cover trade logistics, 
including the time and cost of inland transport to the largest business 
city6. According to the World Bank’s Logistics Performance Index (2007 
and 2010)7, poor performance in just 1 or 2 of these areas may lead to 
serious repercussions for an economy’s overall trade competitiveness. 
Countries that have burdensome documentation requirements, time-
consuming customs procedures, inefficient port operations and inadequate 
transport infrastructure, leading to unnecessary costs and delays for 
traders, are not competitive globally. Therefore, it is difficult to reach 
international markets. That leads to less exports or import, low growth and 
unemployment8. According to the table 6, the top 10 economies on the 
ease of trading are European and Asian. The bottom 10 ranked nations are 
largely African. 
A more plausible explication is that business regulations may have a 
positive effect on growth by removing certain market failures and 
improving economic efficiency. But, business regulations may have a 
negative effect on economic growth by creating substantial costs, 
undesirable distortions,.... The impact of business regulations on growth 
depends on which effect is larger. 
 
Table 6 -Where is trading across borders easy and where not? 
2007 
Easiest Most difficult 
Hong Kong, china 
Finland 
Denmark 
Singapore 
Norway 
Estonia 
Germany 
Canada 
Sweden 
United Arad Emirates 
Congo, Rep. 
Mali 
Zimbabwe 
Uzbekistan 
Zambia 
Burundi 
Kazakhstan 
Kyrgyz Republic 
Niger 
Rwanda 
2011 
Easiest Most difficult 
Singapore 
Hong Kong SAR, China 
United Arab Emirates 
Estonia 
Finland 
Denmark 
Sweden 
Korea, Rep. 
Norway 
Israel 
Niger 
Burkina Faso 
Burundi 
Azerbaijan 
Tajikistan 
Iraq 
Congo, Rep. 
Kazakhstan 
Central African Republic 
Afghanistan 
Source: Doing Business. 
 
It is important to note that, apart from the negative effect of Dealing 
with Construction Permits and Trading Across Bordersindices on growth, 
our finding is important. It reinforces the conclusions from Djankov et al. 
[12] and Hanusch[20]. 
The coefficient on the African dummy is negative and statistically 
significant. This result suggests that regulation indices and control 
6Doing Business 2011 Making a difference for entrepreneurs, November 4, 
2010. 
7 World Bank. Logistics Performance Index, 2007 and 2010 
(http://www.worldbank.org/lpi). 
8Doing Business 2011 Making a difference for entrepreneurs. November 4, 
2010. 
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variables donot matter in term of growth induction. This result does not 
support the idea that Africa’s experience cannot be completely explained 
by the conventional factors of growth, it is plausibly accounted for by 
institutional explanation (Easterly and Levine [15]). However, our finding 
is quite plausible given that civil conflict, mismanagement and disease 
affect this region.We note that adding dummy variable for Africa reduces 
only the magnitude of the doing business indicator coefficient and keeps it 
statistically significant. This result contrasts withHanusch[20]. From an 
econometric point of view, the author introduced severaldummy variables 
(for Africa, East Asia, and Latin America),so the explanatory power of 
doing business indicator is captured by the set of dummy variables rather 
than by any single dummy variable. 
UnlikeBarro[3], the hypothesis of convergence in GDP per capita 
across countries is not robust. The sign on the initial GDP per capita 
variable is negative but generally statistically insignificant.This may be 
explained by the fact that we looked at the growth rate over a very short 
period of time. 
Domestic credit to private sector (% of GDP) is not signed in a 
manner consistent with conventional understandings of the impact of 
financial development on growth(De Serres et al. [11], Levine [23], and 
many others). We find a negative association between Domestic credit to 
private sector (% of GDP) and growth. There is evidence also that 
Government consumption expenditure to GDP hampers growth. By 
contrast, raising Liquid Liabilities appears to help growth. Our findings 
might be partially explained by the fact that the time period is 
characterized by the subprime crisis. Various actions have been taken to 
handle the crisis and to avoid economic recession. Countries have 
introduced reflationary policy (increase in public spending, money 
creation, partial nationalization of banks and industrial) but 
unemployment persists and significant imbalances in the current account 
balances remain. Besides, according to Barro[3, 4], Grier and Tullock[16], 
Kormendi and Meguire[22], and many others, the impact of government 
size on growth depends on how the government uses its revenues. 
Government investment in infrastructure and education for example may 
increase growth and employment in the long term. However, an increase 
in government spending tends to crowds out private investment and 
reduces productivity growth if the consumption share of government 
expenditure is far larger than the investment share. 
Overall, the results also show that debt service ratio tends to affect 
negatively economic growth. This finding is consistent with previous 
empirical evidence. 
The coefficient of human capital is generally found to be positive and 
statistically insignificant at all conventional level9.The result is consistent 
with the literature on cross-nationalgrowth empirics 10 . In fact, many 
studies include a measure of human capital as a determinant of economic 
growth. However, notable differences are found between the model 
specifications, the quality of the data inputs and the results obtained.  
The coefficient associated to absolute deviation from average has 
generally not a statistically significant effect on growth11. 
  
9Dawson [9] discusses the insignificance of human capital when measures of 
government institutions are included in cross-country growth regressions. 
10Wilson and Briscoe [29], present a large body of literature that attempt to 
specify and quantify the link between GNP and human resource. 
11 Results obtained are not reported in the table 4. 
5. Conclusion 
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the debate about the 
relationship between business regulations and economic performance, 
taking into account recent advances in empirical analysis. More precisely, 
we attempt to examine this issue for a sample of 162 countries over the 
period 2007-2011, using regressions with instrumental variables. 
Generally, business regulations effects are assessed in terms of the criteria 
for good governance, this paper focuses on financial development.The 
results show that most regulation indices have the expected signs and are 
positively correlated to the average growth rate. Results are robust to 
several sensitivity exercises. The results are consistentwith those of 
Djankov et al. [12] andHanusch[20]and support the hypothesis that 
“good” business regulations is associated with higher economic 
growth.Although generally disregarded in the previous literature, the 
negative impact of some indices seems to be logical. As regards the 
control variables, the impact of some of these variables on growth is not 
obvious. 
Our findingdraws some implications for economic policy.It suggests 
that reforms, which improve business environment, can help poor nations 
to grow faster. Reform programs should stimulate companies to change 
their behavior, to enhance investment and to encourage innovation. The 
economic policymakers should reduce business costs and risk and 
increase competitive pressure by improving administration and fiscal 
policies, access to finance, legislation and labour administration, access to 
information on the market,…. Each country should examine the criteria of 
business environment separately.  
Our study may have some limitations too. We considered a large 
sample of countries. It is useless to embark on business regulatory reforms 
by making countries into a single standardized model. Moreover, it is 
necessary to know why some countries do not have improved their 
business climates. This might be due to complexities and uncertainties 
surrounding the cost of implementing reforms. We might say that such 
cost influences business regulations-growth nexus. Further research is 
needed to investigate this effect. Besides, the analysis included recent data 
and the time period was characterized by the subprime crisis. There could 
be further revealing results if the period is split into pre-crisis and post-
crisis periods. This might be feasible since the “Doing Business” dataset 
is regularly updated. In addition, the latest Doing Business Report 
includes the ‘Getting Electricity’ indicator. This opens a track for a new 
research. We can look at whether countries that are reforming more in this 
area are growing faster. 
Acknowledgements 
It is a pleasure to thank an anonymous referee for helpful comments. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
[1]Acemoglu D, Simon J, Robinson JA. The Colonial Origins of Comparative 
Development: an Empirical Investigation. American Economic Review 
2001; 91(5): 1369-1401. 
[2] Acemoglu D, Simon J, Robinson JA. Reversal of Fortune: Geography and 
Institutions in the Making of the Modern World Income Distribution. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 2002; 117 November: 1231–1294. 
[3] Barro R. Economic Growth in a Cross- Section of Countries. Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 1991; 106(2): 407-443. 
 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL STRATEGIC MANAGEMENT REVIEW 2 (2014) 69–7878
[4] Barro R. Government Spending in a Simple Model of Economic Growth. 
Journal of Political Economy 1990; 98: 103-125. 
[5] Basmann RL. On finite sample distributions of generalized classical linear 
indentifiability test statistics.  Journal of the American Statistical 
Association 1960; 55: 650-659. 
[6]Busse M, Groizard JL.  Foreign Direct Investment, Regulations and Growth. 
World Economy 2008; 31(7): 861-886. 
[7] Castro R, Clementi GL, MacDonald G. Investor protection, optimal 
incentives, and economic growth. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 2004; 
119: 1131–1175. 
[8] Dall’Olio A, IoottyM,Kanehira N, Saliola F. Productivity Growth in 
Europe. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2013; No. 6425. 
[9] Dawson JW. Institutions, Investment, and Growth: New Cross- Country 
and Panel Data Evidence. Economic Inquiry 1998; 36: 603–619. 
[10] Dawson JW. Regulation, investment, and growth across countries. Cato 
Journal 2006; 26(3): 489-509.  
[11] De Serres A, Kobayakawa S, Slok T, Vartia L. Regulation of Financial 
Systems and Economic Growth. OECD Working Paper 2006; No. 506. 
[12] Djankov S, McLiesh C, Ramalhom R. Regulation and Growth. Economics 
Letters 2006; 92. 
[13] Dollar D, Kraay A. Institutions, Trade and Growth. Journal of Monetary 
Economics 2003; 50(1): 133-162. 
[14] Dutz MA, Kessides I, O’Connell S, Willig RD. Competition and 
Innovation-Driven Inclusive Growth.  World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper 2011; No.5852. 
[15] Easterly W, Levine R. Africa’s Growth Tragedy. Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 1997; 112: 1203-1250. 
[16] Grier K, Tullock G. An Empirical Analysis of Cross-National Economic 
Growt. Journal of Monetary Economics 1987; 24: 259-276. 
[17] Hall Robert E, Jones Charles I. Why do some countries produce so much 
more output per worker than other. Quarterly Journal of Economics 1999; 
144 (1): 83-116. 
[18] Haidar JI. Investor protections and economic growth. Economics Letters 
2009; 103(1): 1-4. 
[19] Haidar J I. The impact of business regulatory reforms on economic 
growth. Journal of The Japanese and International Economies  2012; 26: 
285–307. 
[20] Hanusch M. The Doing Business Indicators, Economic Growth and 
Regulatory Reform. University of Oxford United Kingdom 2011; 30 June. 
[21] Knack S, Keefer P. Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-
Country Tests Using Alternative Measures. Economics and Politics 1995; 
7(3): 207-227. 
[22] Kormendi R, Meguire P. Macro Economic Determinants of Growth: 
Cross-Country Evidence. Journal of Monetary Economics 1985; 16: 141-
163. 
[23] Levine R. Finance and Growth: Theory and Evidence. NBER Working 
Paper 2005; No. 10766. 
[24] Loayza  N, Oviedo A, Serv´en L. Regulation and Macroeconomic 
Performance. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2004; No. 
3469. 
[25] Loayza N, Oviedo A, Serven L. The impact of regulation on growth and 
informality:  cross-country evidence. World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper Series 2005; No. 3623. 
[26] Mauro P. Corruption and Growth.Quarterly Journal of Economics 1995; 
110: 681-712. 
[27] Rodrik Dani, Arvind Subramanian, Trebbi F. Institutions Rule: The 
Primacy of Institutions over Geography and Integration in Economic 
Development. NBER Working Paper  2002;  No. 9305. 
[28] Sargan JD. The estimation of economic relationships using  instrumental 
variables. Econometrica 1958; 26: 393-415. 
[29] Wilson  Rob A, Briscoe G. The impact of human capital on economic 
growth: a review, In: Descy, P.; Tessaring, M. (eds). Impact of education and 
training. Third report on vocational training research in Europe: background 
report. Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities; 2004 (Cedefop Reference series, 54). 
[30] World Bank Doing Business (2004) report. Available online at 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/GIAWB/Doing%20Business/Documen
ts/Annual-Reports/English/DB04-FullReport.pdf 
[31] World Bank Doing Business Database. Available online at 
http://www.doingbusiness.org.
 
 
